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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CURTIS RAY STOVER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43707
Ada County Case No.
CR-2003-77

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Stover failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order
denying his untimely and successive Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence?

Stover Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Of The District Court’s Order
Denying His Untimely, Successive Rule 35 Motion
In 2003, a jury found Stover guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a child
under 16 and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 30 years, with
10 years fixed. (30313 R., pp.65-69.) Stover filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction
of sentence on February 12, 2004, which the district court subsequently denied. (43707
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R., pp.7-8, 15-17.) More than 11 years later, on August 26, 2015, Stover filed a second
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied as
successive and untimely. (43707 R., pp.30-32, 47-48.) Stover filed a notice of appeal
timely only from the district court’s order denying Stover’s second Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence. (43707 R., pp.49-52.)
Stover asserts that the district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence because, he claims, he was sexually assaulted in prison, “causing
[his] sentence to become cruel and unusual punishment.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-3.)
Stover has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion.
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 vests the district court with jurisdiction to consider and act
upon a motion to reduce a sentence that is “filed within 120 days of the entry of the
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction.” I.C.R. 35. The
120-day filing limit is a jurisdictional restraint on the power of the court which deprives
the court of the authority to entertain an untimely motion. State v. Fox, 122 Idaho 550,
552, 835 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hocker, 119 Idaho 105, 106, 803
P.2d 1011, 1012 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Parrish, 110 Idaho 599, 600, 716 P.2d 1371,
1372 (Ct. App. 1986). Idaho Criminal Rule 35 also provides that “no defendant may file
more than one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.” In State v.
Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals held
that “a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an improper successive
motion and is prohibited by Rule 35. We hold that the prohibition of successive motions
under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit.”
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Stover filed his first Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on February 12,
2004. (43707 R., pp.7-8.) The district court denied the motion on March 4, 2004.
(43707 R., pp.15-17.) More than 11 years later, on August 26, 2015, Stover filed a
second, successive Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence requesting that the
district court reduce his sentence “so that [he] may receive mental health and medical
care, in an environment so that [he] may feel safe from repercussions.” (43707 R.,
pp.30-32.) On October 9, 2015, the district court entered an order denying Stover’s
motion, correctly finding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief on the Rule 35 motion
for sentence reduction because the motion was both successive and untimely. (43707
R., pp.47-48.) Because Stover’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence was filed
over 11 years after the entry of judgment, and because the motion was an improper,
successive Rule 35 motion, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The
court’s order denying Stover’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence must
therefore be affirmed.
To the extent that Stover is now claiming, for the first time on appeal, that his
sentence is illegal because his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence “had valid
issues that caused [his] sentence to become illegal” (Appellant’s brief, p.1), this issue
was not preserved below, and therefore is improperly raised on appeal. Stover failed to
request correction of an illegal sentence from the district court, but instead requested a
reduction of sentence “so that [he] may receive mental health and medical care, in an
environment so that [he] may feel safe from repercussions.” (43707 R., p.31.) Stover
may yet file a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence in the district court.
However, because Stover failed to raise the issue of an illegal sentence in the district
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court, he has failed to show that the issue is preserved and he is not entitled to
appellate relief in relation to his illegal sentence claim.
Failure to raise an issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court the
opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal.
State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121
Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942
P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). “Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224,
45 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125,
129 (1995)); accord State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 307 P.3d 187 (2013). While an
exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error, the burden
of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant asserting the error
for the first time on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 228, 245 P.3d at 976, 980. To
carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must
demonstrate that the error he alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245
P.3d at 980, quoted in Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190.
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows that Stover
waived appellate consideration of his claim that the trial court erred “in denying the Rule
35 motion, which had valid issues that caused [his] sentence to become illegal.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.1.)

As stated above, Stover did not file a Rule 35 motion for
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correction of an illegal sentence and did not otherwise ask the sentencing court to
correct an illegal sentence. Nor has he argued on appeal that the district court’s failure
to correct an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error under the standards
articulated in Perry, supra. (See generally, Appellant’s brief, pp.1-3.) Even if he had,
the claim would fail under the first prong of Perry, which requires Stover to demonstrate
a violation of one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,
245 P.3d at 980. Because the “right” to correction of an illegal sentence reduction
stems from a rule of criminal procedure – I.C.R. 35 – and not from any constitutional
provision, Stover’s claim of error fails to satisfy even the threshold requirement for
review under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331
P.3d 529, 534 (Ct. App. 2014); compare Carter, 155 Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191
(because claim that sentencing court erred by not sua sponte ordering psychological
evaluation in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522 asserted a statutory violation, not a
violation of a constitutional right, the claim was not reviewable as fundamental error).
Furthermore, even if Stover’s claim satisfied the first prong of Perry, the claim would fail
under the second prong of Perry, which requires Stover to demonstrate that the error he
alleges plainly exists without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. There is no evidence
contained in the record that supports Stover’s claim that his sentence is illegal.
Because the issue was not raised below, and because Stover has not even
asserted fundamental error, much less carried his burden of establishing it, this Court
must decline to consider the merits of Stover’s claim that the trial court erred by denying
his Rule 35 motion.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Stover’s untimely, successive Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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